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Developing  countries are well advised to adopt  tivities and exports in general should be ex-
appropriate tariff and tax policies.  An ideal  empted from tariffs on their iriputs.
scheme of such policies would include the
following:  *  Value-added taxes should be levied on all
commodities at equal rates, supplemented by
- Export taxes should be set on the basis of  excise taxes on luxury commodities and on com-
the long run elasticity of foreign demand in the  modities that create negative consumption
case of commodities in which the country has  extemalities.
market power and at a rate to ensure that export-
able production equals the quota when export  In moving toward an ideal policy scheme,
quotas are applied.  value-added taxes and excises on luxury cnm-
modities and on commodities that create nega-
- Import  tariffs should be set at equal rates  tive consumption extemalities can be established
on all manufactured goods, complemented by  instantaneously while a tariff reform will take
taxes on their primary inputs, to ensure equal  time.  At the same time, tariffs should be re-
effective rates of protection at desirable levels,  formed according to a predetermined timetable,
preferably not excecding 10 percent.  Primary ac-  made public in advance, that permits producers
to adjust.
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This  paper  will  deal  with issues  relating  to tariff  policy  and
taxation  in  developing  countries. Section  I  of the  paper  will  briefly  review
the  conditions  of optimal  commodity  taxation. In  Section  II,  the  assumptions
will  be  made  that  import  tariffs  provide  the  only  possible  form  of taxation,
that  the  country  does  not  affect  world  market  prices  and  there  are  ao export
quotas,  and  that  there  are  no externalities  in  production.  Section  III  will
examine  the  case  when  a country  can  affect  world  market  prices  or there  are
export  quotas. In  Section  IV,  externalities  in  production  will  be
introduced.  Section  V will  combine  the  analysis  of the  previous  sections,  and
Section  VI will  consider  issues  of policy  adjustment.
I.  Optimal  Commodity  Taxation
On the  assumptions  that  lump-sum  taxes  are  not  feasible  and  that
producer  prices  are fixed,  in  dealing  with  a representative  consumer,  Ramsey
(1927)  devised  rules  for  optimal  commodity  taxation. He  considered  the
problem  of raising  a given  revenue  from  the  consumer  in such  a  way  as to
minimize  the  loss  of  utility  that  arises  from  taxation.  1/
In  the  case  when  the  demand  for  each  commodity  depends  only  on the
commodity's  own  price  but  not  on the  prices  of other  commodities,  tax  rates
should  be inversely  proportional  to the  elasticity  of  demand. In the  more
1/ The implications  of removing  the  assumption  of fixed  producer  prices  will
be noted  below. It  will  further  be indicated  that  the  use  of  consumption
taxes  avoids  creating  inefficiencies  at the  production  level.- 2  -
general  case,  when  allowance  is  made for  intercommodity  substitution,  optimal
taxation  ca11s  proportional  reductions  in (compensated)  demand  for  all
commodities.  l/
Assuming  that  leisure  is  not taxed,  the  Ramsey  rule  can  be
interpreted  in terms  of complementarity  with,  and  substitution  for,  leisure
(Deaton,  1981,  p. 1250). Now, if  each  commodity  is  equally  substitutable
(complementary)  for  leisure,  uniform  taxation  of all  commodities  will be
optimal. Should  this  not be  the  case,  commodities  that  tend  to complement
leisure  should  bear  higher  taxes. In this  way,  one  will  indirectly  tax
leisure.
To simplify,  one  may  recommend  a uniform  tax  on all  commodities,  with
additional  excise  taxes  imposed  on commodities  that  are  complementary  with
leisure. This  will  call  for  excise  taxes  on pleasure  boats,  sports  cars,  golf
clubs  and  a paraphernalia  of comodities that  are  used in  carrying  out  leisure
activities.
Next,  consider  the  case  of  many consumers.  Now, income
distributional  considerations  will  enter,  and  excise  taxes  may be levied  on
commodities  consumed  by the  rich. These  commodities  will  often  be
complementary  with  leisure  but  not  necessarily  so.
Finally,  one  may introduce  considerations  of consumption
externalities.  This  will  lead  to the  imposition  of so-called  sin  taxes  (e.g.
taxes  on alcohol  and  tobacco)  on the  grounds  that  the  deterioration  of the
health  of individuals,  consequent  upon  their  consumption,  will  entail  a cost
to society.
1/  For  a recent  exposition,  see  Stern  1987.- 3 -
An attempt  has  been  made  here  to safeguard  uniform  commodity  taxation
in  a  world  where  the  Ramsey  rule  applies,  with  the  introduction  of  additional
excise  taxes  for  commodities  which  are  complementary  with  leisure,  are
consumed  by the  rich,  and  involve  negative  consumption  externalities.  This
has  been  done  for  the  case  where  all  commodities  are  taxed  and  leisure  is
untaxed.
The situation  is more  complicated  if there  are  untaxed  commodities,
such  as the  services  of domestic  servants  or imputed  income  from  owner-
occupied  housing  (Harberger,  1988,  p.  6).  The  derivation  of the  appropriate
set  of commodity  taxes  would  now require  information  on complementarity  and
substitutability  among  commodities  that  are  difficult  to obtain.
In reference  to complementary  with,  and substitution  for,  leisure,
Deaton  observed,  "it  is likely  that  empirically  calculated  tax  rates,  based  on
econometric  estimates  of parameters,  will  be determined  in structure,  not  by
the  measurements  actually  made,  but  by arbitrary,  untested  (and  even
unconscious)  hypotheses  chosen  by the  econometrician  for  practical
convenience"  (1981,  p. 1245). These  strictures  apply  even  more strongly  if
there  are  many  untaxed  commodities.
And  how  about  the  assumption  of fixed  producer  prices? This  will  be
the  case  for  traded  goods  under  free  trade  in  a country  that  cannot  affect
world  market  prices. For  nontraded  goods,  the  assumption  requires  constant
costs  of production.  In cases  when  decreasing  costs  apply,  such  as public
utilities,  adjustments  would  need  to be  made  in tax  rates. This  may  be done- 4 -
in  conjunction  with  the  pricing  of public  utilities  that  requires  equating
prices  to marginal  costs.  1/
In practice,  then,  one  may utilize  uniform  commodity  taxes,  with  the
addition  of excises  for  the  reasons  mentioned  above. Under  the  assumptions
made,  uniform  commodity  taxes  should  apply  at the  consumption  level,  so  as to
avoid  creating  inefficiencies  at the  production  level. Also,  under  the
destination  principle,  exports  are  exempted  from  the  tax  that  is imposed  on
imports.
Consumption  taxes  may  be levied  in the  form  of a sales  tax  on final
consumption  goods  or in the  form  of a value  added  tax.  The  former  has the
advantage  of simplicity  while  the  latter  would  ensure  that  taxes  are  actually
imposed  by allowing  for  deductions  of value  added  taxes  paid  at earlier  stages
of fabrication.
In fact,  developed  countries  have  increasingly  adopted  value  added
taxes,  except  that  in the  United  States  sales  taxes  are  levied  by the
states. There  are  further  excise  taxes  on luxury  commodities  (many  of which
are  complementary  with  leisure)  as well  as sin  taxes.
Value  added  taxes  have  come  to be  used  also  in developing
countries. But  in  the  large  majority  of cases  commodity  taxes  take  the  form
of a turnover  tax,  levied  at each  stage  of fabrication.  This  tax  has  various
disadvantages.  To begin  with,  producers'  choices  between  taxed  intermediate
inputs  and  untaxed  inputs  are  distorted. Also,  there  are  distortions  among
1/  In a general  equilibrium  framework,  nontraded  goods  other  than  public
utilities  will  be subject  to increasing  costs. This  would  imply  taxing
them  at a  higher  rate  than  traded  goods,  which  is just  the  opposite  of the
situation  commonly  obser-ed  as far  as import-competing  goods  are
concerned.commodities  that  go through  a  different  number  of stages  of fabrication  or are
subject  to different  tax  rates. FinAlly,  incentives  are  provided  for  the
vertical  integration  of the  productin.  process  in  order  to escape  the
cascading  turnover  tax.
II.  Tariffs  in the  Place  of  Commodity  Taxes
Next,  we introduce  tax  collection  costs. As Corden  notes,  "firstly,
there  are  the  costs  of tax  administration  incurred  by the  tax-collecting
authority...  Secondly,  there  are  the  resource  costs  incurred  by taxpayers  to
fulfil  their  tax  obligations  while  minimizing  payment,  or perhaps  to  ensure
successful  evasion... Thirdly,  there  are  the  distortion-costs  which  result
from  taxpayers  rearranging  their  affairs  as part  of  an avoidance  or evasion
effort"  (1974,  p. 65). According  to  Corden,  "the  central  point  is that
collection  costs  for  trade  taxes  are  generally  much lower  than  for  other
taxes"  (Ibid),  when  the  latter  include  commodity  as  well  as income  taxes. /
Riemman  and  Slemrod  went  further  in  arguing  that  "if  there  is  a cost
associated  with  collecting  taxes,  tariffs  are  part  of a first-best  tax  package
provided  their  collection  cost is  small  enough  relative  to excise  taxes"
(1987,  p. 545). The  authors  further  provided  evidence  that  the  share  of taxes
on international  transactions  is  related  to the  cost  of tax  collection.  The
cost  of tax  collection,  in turn,  is shown  to  vary  with  the  level  of
development.
1/  Commodity  taxes  are  defined  here  to  exclude  trade  taxes  (import  tariffs
and  export  taxes).Let  us take  the  extreme  case  where  collection  costs  on domestic
taxes  -/  are  so  high that  only  taxes  on international  transactions  are  used.
2/  Assume  further  that  these  taxes  take  the  form  of import  tariffs,  that  the
country  cannot  affect  world  market  prices  and  there  are  no export  quotas,  and
that  there  are  no externalities  in production.
The  question  arises,  then,  what is  the  optimal  choice  of import
tariffs  to  raise  a given  revenue. This  question  will  be dealt  with  by
focusing  on production  efficiency  and  neglecting  efficiency  in  consumption  on
the  grounds  that  the  application  of the  Ramsey  rule is  even  more  difficult  in
developing  than  in  developed  countries.  31  Production  efficiency  is  reached
when  effective  protection  rates  on value  added  are  equalized,  thereby
providing  equal  incentives  to  all  productive  activities.
As a starting  point,  note  that  the  ap,iication  of import  tarifis  and
export  subsidies  at identical  rates  would  result  in  a situation  where
effective  rates  of protection  are  equalized,  thereby  ensuring  production
1/  Domestic  taxes  include  commodity  taxes  as well  as income  taxes;  income
taxes  are  not  considered  in this  paper. It  can  be shown  that  consumption
taxes  are superior  to income  taxes  if savings  are introduced,  provided
that  each  commodity  is equally  substitutable  for  leisure  (Atkinson  and
Stiglitz,  1972).
2/  This  is indeed  an extreme  case  that  is  used  purely  as an  expository
device. Thus,  according  to  World  Development  Report,  1988,  "the
administrative  costs  of trade  and  excise  taxes  normally  range  from  1  to 3
percent  of revenue  collected. The  corresponding  figure  for  VAT  can  be  as
high  as 5 percent;  for  personal  income  taxes  it  can  reach  10 percent"  (p.
85). Also,  as noted  in Section  V, tariffs  involve  a considerable
efficiency  cost  that  should  be  contrasted  to the  cost  of collection.
3/  See,  however,  the  excellenL  paper  by  Mitra  on India  (1987). See  also
Dahl,  Devarajan,  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1986)  and  Section  V below.efficiency.  1.  However,  such  a combination  would  raise  no revenue  in a
situation  of  balance-of-payments  equilibrium,  hence  the  use  of import  tariffs.
Consider  a  model  of three  commodities:  a final  good,  an intermediate
good  used  in its  manufacture,  and  an export  good,  which  is  not  used  in the
production  of the  final  good  and it  does  not  use  the  intermediate  good  as an
input. In the  absence  of  production  externalities,  thp  optimal  situation
would  involve  zero  tartffs. However,  in the  case  considered,  tariffs  need to
be levied  for  revenue  purposes.
If the  final  good  and  the  intermediate  good  are  equally  substitutable
in  production  for  the  export  good,  the  second-best  optimum  would  entail
levying  tariffs  at equal  rates  on the  final  good  and  on the  intermediate
good.  In this  case,  the  effective  rate  of protection  would  equal  the  tariff
rate  on the  final  as well  as  on the  intermediate  good  while  the  effective  rate
of protection  on the  export  good  would  be  nil.
By comparison,  levying  a tariff  only  on the  final  good  would  be
suboptimal.  In this  eventuality,  raising  a  given  revenue  would  require  a
higher  tariff  and  the  effective  rate  of protection  on the  final  good  would
exceed  this  tariff  while  it  would  be nil  on the  intermediate  good. The
effective  rate  of protection  would  remain  nil  on the  export  good.
These  conclusions  can  be illustratee  by an example. Take the  case
when  the  final  good,  the  intermediate  gcod,  and  export  good  each  represent
one-third  of value  added  in the  economy  and  the  intermediate  good  provides
one-half  of the  value  ef output  for  the  final  good. Under  one  alternative,
tariffs  --  and  hence  effective  rates  of protection  --  are  10  percent  on both
1/  In fact,  if  adjustment  is  made  for  the  exchange  rate,  these  rates  are  nil.- 8 -
the  final  and  the intermediate  good.  Under  another  alternative,  a 20 percent
tariff  is  levied  on the  final  good  and  there  is  no tariff  on the  intermediate
good,  resulting  in a  40 percent  effective  protection  on the  former  and  nil
effective  protection  on the  latter.
Government  revenue  will  be the  same  under  the  two  alternatives.
However,  the  bias  against  exports,  measured  by the  average  effective  rate  of
protection  on the  final  and  the  intermediate  good,  will  be greater  under  the
second  alternative  and there  will  also  be discrimination  in favor  of the
final,  and  against  the  intermediate,  good.
A special  case iq  when the  intermediate  good  cannot  be produced
domestically.  Now, if  the  intermediate  good  accounts  for  one-half  of product
value  under  free  trade,  setting  the  duty  on the  intermediate  good  at double
that  of the  final  good  will  ensure  nil  effective  protection  for  the  latter.
Tariff  revenue  can  thus  be provided  with  nil  effective  protection.  -J
The  above  conclusions  can  be readily  extended  to the  case  when  there
are  many  goods. Second-best  optimum  will require  setting  uniform  tariffs  if
all  import-competing  goods  are  equally  substitutable  in production  for  the
export  goods;  imposing  the  uniform  tariff  on export  goods  used  in the
production  of import-competing  goods;  and instituting  a duty  drawback  scheme
for  inputs  used  in  the  production  of  export  goods.  2/
Nor  are  the  conclusions  affected  if  non-traded  inputs  are  introduced
in the  analysis  as long  as the  Corden  convey on  of calculating  effective
1/  This  point  is  made in  Harberger,  1988,  p. 18.
2/  It  should  be  noted  that  tL&e  proposed  scheme  involves  imposing  the  ur form
tariff  rate  also  on imports  that  are  not  produced  domestically.rates  of protection  is  applied. Under  this  convention,  value  added  in  the
production  of the  nor-traded  good  is  combined  with  value  added  in the
production  of the  tradeu  good  using  the  non-traded  input  while  the
intermediate  good  used  in  the  production  of the  non-traded  good  is combined
with the  intermediate  good  used  in the  production  of the  traded  good  in
question.
Up to this  point,  the  analysis  has  been  conducted  in  the  form  of a
model  that  distinguishes  between  import-competing  and  export  goods. However,
import-competing  goods  may  also  be  exported  if  conditions  are  favorable. Such
nontraditional  exports  should  also  receive  tariff  exemptions  on their  imported
inputs  just  as traditional  exports.
A related  issue  is  that  exporters  should  be  given  a free  cihoice
between  imported  and  domestic  inputs. This  will ensure  that  low-cost  inputs
are  chosen  and,  at the  same  time,  provide  incentives  for  the  producers  of
domestic  inputs  to improve  their  operation.
Tariff  exemptions  for inputs  used in  exports  have  been  widely  used  in
developing  countries. It  has  been  suggested,  however,  that  in Sub-Saharan
Africa  drawback  schemes  providing  tariff  rebates  for  inputs  used  in  exports
have  not  been successful  (Shalizi  and Squire,  1988,  p. 10),  and  problems  have
been  encountered  in  some  Latin  American  countries  as  well.
In the  case  of  these  countries,  use  should  be  made  of international
experience  with  tariff  rebate  schemes  or,  if such  efforts  are  unsuccessful,
duty  free  entry  may  be  ensured  in the  framewor;  of free  trade  zones. Should
this  not  work,  one  may consider  the  graduation  of tariffs  so  as to  minimize
adverse  effects  on exports. But  this  is  only  a possibility  rather  than  a- 10  -
certainty,  because  uniform  tariffs  may still  be superior  to  non-uniform
tariffs.
Ili. The  Case  of  Optimal  Export  Taxes
In the  case  discussed  in  Section  II,  the  hypothetical  developing
country  was  a price  taker  in  world  markets. Next,  we consider  the  case  when
the  country  can  affect  world  market  prices  by its  own  actions. In this
eventuality,  export  taxes  may  be used.  These  taxes  should  be set  on the  basis
of the  long-run  elasticity  of foreign  demand  so  as to  maximize  economic
welfare  in the  country  concerned  1!  (Mantel  and  Marterina-Mantel,  1986). It
should  be noted,  however,  that  there  ar-t  relatively  few  such  cases  in
developing  countries.
Export  taxes  will be the  o-timal  measure  also  if  a country  is subject
to  quotas  on its  exports. Such  will  be the  case  under  an international
commodity  agreement  or under  foreign  quotas  and so-called  voluntary  export
restraints.  In these  instances,  export  taxes  can  be used  to  appropriate  the
quota  profits  enjoyed  by the  exporters. They  should  be set  so  as to ensure
that  exportable  production  equals  the  amount  of the  quota.  2/
Examples  of international  commodity  agreements  are  OPEC  and  the
International  Coffee  Agreement. And  while  oil  production  is  carried  out
mostly  by state  enterprises,  the  export  taxes  will  indicate  their  obligatioti
to  the  government  budget. In turn,  coffee  is  produced  on private  farms  that
can  be subjected  to  export  taxes;  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  these  taxes  have
1/ Note,  however,  that  optimal  export  taxes  imposed  by individual  countries
reduce  world  welfare.
2/  Alternatively,  use  may  be made  of a system  of auctions.- 11 -
taken  the  form  of profits  by government-owned  marketing  boards  that  pay  less
than  the  world  market  price  for  coffee.
Exports  of textiles  and  clothing  are limited  under  the  Multifiber
Arrangement;  steel  exports  are subject  to limitations  under  bilateral
agreements;  and some  developed  countries  limit  the  imports  of footwear  and
certain  electronics  products  from  particular  developing  countries. In  all
these  cases,  export  taxes  will  be an optimal  measure. Such  taxes  have indeed
been  used in  the  form  of fees  for  "quota  tickets"  under  the  MFA  in East  Asian
countries.
In  the  cases  described,  export  taxes  should  be used  even  if  domestic
taxes  are  available  as they  represent  a first-best  measure. The  question
arises,  however,  if  developing  countries  would  derive  sufficient  revenues  from
export  taxes. Such  will be the  case  only  for  a few  OPEC  countries  with  small
populations.  Correspondingly,  tariffs  should  also  be  applied  as long  as
domestic  taxes  are  not  feasible  (the  assumption  made  in Section  II).
Export  taxes  are  widely  employed  by  developing  countries. A 1987
study  of 74 countries  found  that  export  taxes  were  used  in  at least  53 of
these  countries  (World  Development  Report,  1988,  p. 91). This  represents  an
excessive  use  of export  taxes  as countries  used  export  taxes  also in  the  place
of land  taxes  and  commodity  taxes,  which  provide  revenue  at a lesser  economic
cost.
IV.  Production  Externalities
Assume  next  that  the  necessary  revenue  can  be provided  through
domestic  taxes  but  there  are  production  externalities  in  the  manufacturing
sector  that  call  for  the  preferential  treatment  of this  sector. Such
externalities  may  result  from  the  "production"  of skills  and technological- 12 -
change,  the  benefits  of which  are  not  captured  by the  profit  calculations  of
the  entrepreneur.  There  is said  to be  a difference  in this  regard  between
manufacturing  and  agricultural  activities  as the  latter  generally  use  less
skilled  labor,  and  teclnological  change  is  promoted  chiefly  by agricultural
stations  rather  than  by individual  firms.
If this  were the  case,  it  would  be optimal  to use  measures  to
increase  value  added  in  manufacturing.  Bertrand  has  considered  this  case  for
the  event  that  the  objective  is  to attain  a certain  amount  of value  added  in
the  manufacturing  sector,  or a certain  share  of national  value  added  in  the
sector  (Bertrand,  1972).
Bertrand  has  shown  the  following  decision  rules  to  be appropriate  in
the  case  described: (1)  equalize  the  effective  rate  of protection  within  the
manufacturing  sector;  (2)  equalize  the  effective  rate  of protection  within  the
non-manufacturing  (primary)  sector;  and  (3)  establish  a common  rate  of
discrimination  between  manufacturing  and  non-manufacturing  activities. This
amounts  to the  application  of the  "market  principle"  under  which  equal
protection  is  accorded  to  all  manufacturing  activities,  letting  competition  do
the  rest.
The  next  question  concerns  the  rate  at which  protection  is  provided
to  manufacturing  activities.  The  author  has suggested  that  "considering  ...
the  lack  of  empirical  evidence  on external  economies  and  the  observed  adverse
effects  of  high  protection,  it  would  appear  that  effective  protection  rates  on
manufacturing  activities  in  excess  of 10  percent  would  involve  costs  that  are
not  commensurate  with  the  expected  benefits"  (Balassa,  1977  p.  20).
While  the  expression  "protection"  has  been  used  above,  the  first  best
alternative  is to  provide  production  subsidies  to  manufacturing  activities.- 13  -
This  will  rarely  be possible,  however,  because  of financial  limitations  in
developing  countries. Import  tariffs  cum  export  subsidies  would  have  the  same
effect,  except  for  increasing  the  cost  of consumption.  But,  export
subsidization  again  requires  revenues  and  it is  also  open  to  countervailing
action. Correspondingly,  the  measures  taken  may  be limited  to rebating
indirect  taxes  and tariffs  on inputs  into  export  production  and  providing
other  GATT-conforming  export  incentives.
Thus,  while  ideally  import  substitution  and  exports  in  the
manufacturing  sector  should  receive  equal  incentives,  thereby  ensuring  the
equality  of effective  rates  of  protection  on import  substituting  and  export
activities  in this  sector,  in  practice  some  bias  against  export  activities  has
to be  accepted. At the  same  time,  the  proposed  10  percent  effective
protection  on the  manufacturing  sector  would  minimize  this  bias.
For  reasons  discussed  in  Section  II,  providing  equal  effective
protection  in  manufacturing  would  necessitate  setting  uniform  tariffs  on
manufacturing  activities,  complemented  with the  taxation  of primary  inputs  at
the  same  uniform  rate. In turn,  primary  activities  and  all  exports  should  be
exempted  from  tariffs  on their  inputs.
V.  Commodity  Taxation  cum  Import  Tariffs  and  Export  Taxes
Note  has  been  taken  of the  fact  that  collection  costs  are  lower  for
import  tariffs  than  for  commodity  taxes.  11  The  reverse  of the  medal  is  that
import  tariffs  involve  higher  economic  costs  than  commodity  taxes  do.
According  to a study  of the  Philippines,  the  marginal  economic  cost  of import
1/  As noted  earlier,  commodity  taxes  are  defined  to exclude  trade  taxes
(import  tariffs  and  export  taxes).- 14  -
tariffs  is rising  rapidly  with the  rate  of tariff  while  there  are  only  very
small  increases  in  the  case  of commodity  taxes. Thus,  the  marginal  economic
cost  of a 25 percent  tariff  is  2.25  times  the  revenue  raised  while  it is
negligible  for  commodity  taxes. Also,  the  marginal  economic  cost  is 75
percent  for  a 15  percent  tariff  and 150  percent  for  a 21  percent  tariff
(Clarete  and  Whalley,  1987).
It  would  appear,  then,  that  the  economic  costs  of tariffs  will  tend
to outweigh  their  collection  cost  advantages  relative  to  commodity  taxes.
Thus,  above  a very  low  level  of development,  where  collection  costs  of
commodity  taxes  are  especially  high,  it  may  be suggested  that  tariffs  be used
only  to compensate  for  production  externalities.
One  may  now  consider  the  elements  of an optimal  tax  structure  for
developing  countries.  The  elements  of this  structure  include  commodity  taxes
(a  consumption  tax  and  excises),  import  tariffs,  and  export  taxes. The
appropriate  rules  may  be  described  in reverse  order.
1.  Export  taxes  should  be set  on the  basis  of the  long-run
elasticity  of foreign  demand  in  the  case  of commodities  in  which  the  country
has  market  power  and  at  a rate  to  ensure  that  exportable  production  equals  the
quota  in the  case  when  export  quotas  are  applied.
2.  Import  tariffs  should  be set  at equal  rates  on all  manufactured
goods,  complemented  by taxes  on their  primary  inputs,  so  as to ensure  equal
effective  rates  of protection  at  desirable  levels,  preferably  not  exceeding  10
percent. Primary  activities  and  all  exports  should  be exempted  from  tariffs
on their  inputs.
3.  Value  added  taxes  should  be levied  on all  commodities  at equal
rates,  supplemented  by excise  taxes  on luxury  commodities  and  on commodities- 15  -
that  create  negative  consumption  externalities.
This  sequence  is  logical  since  one  would  have to  determine  first  the
amount  of revenue  that  may  be collected  by export  taxes  and  by tariffs  that
compensate  for  production  externalities.  Rates  of commodity  taxes  may,  then,
be set  to  provide  for  revenue  goals. At the  same  time,  the  rate  of the  value
added  tax  will  depend  on the  revenues  obtainable  from  excises.
It should  be emphasized  that  the  proposed  value  added  and  excise
taxes  would  equally  apply  to  domestic  production  and  to imports. Thus,  the
objection  raised  by Shalizi  and  Squire,  according  to which  "there  is  no reason
to suppose  that  uniform  nominal  tariffs  imply  uniform  rates  of  effective
protection  when there  are  other  taxes  on trade  and  production  in the  system"
(p.  9) does  not  apply  to the  described  scheme. It  does  apply,  however,  to
many  actual  systems  of protection.
VI.  Reforming  Commodity  Taxes,  Import  Tariffs  and  Export  Taxes
Section  V described  an optimal  structure  of commodity  taxes,  import
tariffs,  and  export  taxes  in  a developing  country. In  practice,  however,  we
do not  deal  with  a tabula  rasa  but  rather  the  existing  structure  of  commodity
taxes,  import  tariffs,  and  export  taxes  needs  to be reformed.
In  many  developing  countries,  the  existing  structure  includes
turnover  taxes  and  various  excises;  quantitative  import  restrictions;  import
tariffs  levied  at varying  rates,  giving  rise  to highly  disparate  levels  of
effective  protection;  and  export  taxes  in  excess  of optimal  levels. The
question  is,  then,  how  can  one  transform  the  existing  structure  into  an
optimal  one.
There  have  been  instances  in  developing  countries  when  commodity
taxes  were  reformed  in  a single  action  through  the  establishment  of a value- 16  -
added  tax  and  excise  taxes. Such  was  the  case  in 1983  in  Indonesia,  for
example.
At the  same  time,  in Indonesia  the  value  added  tax  applies  only  to
manufactured  goods;  it is  levied  at the  manufacturing  and import  stage;  and it
excludes  small  firms. Other  countries  in  a similar  situation  may  also  adopt
such  a compromise  solution,  with  a  view  to eventually  progressing  towards  a
comprehensive  value  added  tax.  This  tax  is  used  in a  number  of Latin  American
countries,  although  small  firms  are  excluded  in  some  cases.
Parallel  with the  establishment  of  a value  added  tax,  one  may reduce
export  taxes  to optimal  levels. In this  way,  the  rate  of  the  value  added  tax
is  set  so as to compensate  for  the  loss  of the  export  tax  revenue. Such  was
the  case  in  Malawi  in 1986-87,  where  a consumption-tax  type  commodity  tax  was
established  at the  manufacturer  and  importer  level.
quantitative  import  restrictions  should  be replaced  by tariffs.
Also,  the  system  of tariffs  should  be reformed,  with  a view  to  establishing  an
optimal  tariff  structure.  However,  an optimal  tariff  structure  cannot  be
established  instantaneously.  This  is because  of the  need  for  adjustment  in
the  production  structure  established  in response  to the  existing  tariffs.
Rather,  changes  should  be  made  over  time.  But,  this  should  be  done  according
to  a predetermined  timetable,  announced  in advance,  so  as to permit  producers
to  adjust.
The timetable  would  involve  reducing  high tariffs  and  raising  tariffs
that  are  below  the  long  term  target  of 10 percent. In reducing  high  tariffs- 17  -
use  may  be  made of the  "concertina"  method,  according  to  which  the  higher  the
tariff  the  greater  are the  reductions  (Corden,  1974,  pp.  369-70).  1/
Setting  tariffs  on inputs  has  been  objected  to  by Shalizi  and  Squire
on the  grounds  that  "it  provides  protection  to the  domestic  production  of
inputs  relative  to production  for  export"  (p.  10). However,  in the  absence  of
tariffs  on inputs,  their  production  is discriminated  against  relative  to  the
production  of final  goods. Thus,  imposing  tariffs  on inputs  will  result  in  a
welfare  improvement  by reducing  discrimination  against  these  inputs  as  well  as
in  a welfare  deterioration  by increasing  discrimination  against  exports.
Michaely  notes  that  "the  question  of which  impact  is  more important  would
depend  on the  elasticities  of substitution  among  the  sectors  involved. It  may
be presumed  that  the  welfare-enhancing  substitution  will  dominate;  but  this  is
an empirical  judgment,  or guess,  rather  than  a logical  necessity"  (Michaely,
Papageorgiou,  and  Choksi,  1989,  Appendix  A-2, p. 13).
One  may  go a step  further  and  argue  that  there  will  be a welfare
improvement  if the  elasticity  of substitution  for  exports  in  production  is the
same  across-the-board  and increases  in  tariffs  on inputs  are  compensated  by
reductions  in  tariffs  on final  products. Under  the  assumptions  made  in
Section  II  of the  paper,  the  average  bias  of the  incentive  system  against
1/  Needless  to say,  increases  in  taxes  on domestic  production  are  equivalent
to reductions  in import  tariffs.- 18  -
exports  will  decline  in such  a case  while  differences  in  effective  protection
rates  among  import-competing  goods  will  be reduced.  1/
Conclusions
This  paper  has considered  tariff  policy  and  taxation  in  developing
countries. Following  a discussion  of optimal  commodity  taxation,  the  paper
examined  the  imposition  of impart  tariffs  under  alternative  assumptions.
First,  it  was  assumed  that  domestic  taxes  cannot  be  used,  that  the  country
cannot  affect  world  market  prices  and  there  are  no export  quotas,  and  that
there  are  no externalities  in production.  Next,  consideration  was  given  to
the  case  when  the  country  can  affect  world  market  prices  or there  are  export
quotas. Subsequently,  the  case  of production  externalities  was  examined.
Finally,  commodity  taxation  was introduced  simultaneously  with import  tariffs
and  export  taxation.
In the  latter  cape,  it  was suggested  that  an ideal  scheme  should
include  the  following:
1.  Export  taxes  should  be set  on the  basis  of the  long-run
elasticity  of foreign  d-mand  in the  case  of commodities  in  which  the  country
has  market  power  and  at a rate  to  ensure  that  exportable  production  equals  the
quota  in the  case  when  export  quotas  are  applied.
2.  Import  tariffs  should  be set  at  equal  rates  on all  manufactured
goods,  complemented  by taxes  on their  primary  inputs,  so  as to ensure  equal
effective  rates  of protection  at  desirable  levels,  preferably  not  exceeding  10
1/  This  is  apparent  from  the  example  cited  in  Section  II that  considered  two
alternatives,  which  provided  equal  tariff  revenue.- 19  -
percent. Primary  activities  and  all  exports  should  be  exempted  from  tariffs
on their  inputs.
3.  Value  added  taxes  should  be levied  on all  commodities  at  equal
rates,  supplemented  by excise  taxes  on luxury  commodities  and  on commodities
that  create  negative  consumption  externalities.
The  proposed  tax  structure  would  represent  a considerable  change  in
developing  countries  compared  with the  present  situation. In  particular,  in
1985  trade  taxes  accounted  for  35  percent  of total  tax  revenue  in  Sub-Saharan
Africa,  23 percent  in  Asia,  22 percent  in the  Middle  East  and  North  Africa,
and 17  percent  in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean,  compared  with  2 percent  in
the  industrial  countries  (World  Development  Report,  1988,  p.  84).
As to  policy  reform,  it  was suggested  that  value  added  taxes  and
excises  on luxury  commodities  and  on commodities  that  create  negative
consumption  externalities  can  be established  instantaneously  while  a tariff
reform  will  take  time. At the  same  time,  tariffs  should  be reformed  according
to  a predetermined  timetable,  made public  in  advance,  that  permits  producers
to  adjust.- 20 -
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